시진핑의 장쩌민(상하이 파) 뭉개기 스토리

For Chinese President Xi Jinping, all politics is hyperlocal. His electorate consists of the political elite: the hundreds of sitting and retired Chinese leaders, generals, and power brokers clustered in and around the seat of government in Beijing’s Zhongnanhai. Shortly after taking office in 2012, Xi launched a widespread campaign to eradicate corruption at both the bottom and the top of the Chinese Communist Party. This anti-corruption campaign is the signature fight of Xi’s presidency — and for him a priority over “life, death, and reputation,” he reportedly told the Politburo, China’s elite 25-member ruling body, in a June 2014 speech.

Xi seems to be focusing his anti-corruption campaign on retired members of the elite: not in quantity, per se — far more low-level officials have been sacked or arrested — but in intensity. Xi has targeted men like Zhou Yongkang, a retired official who formerly served in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the group of seven men at the apex of the Communist Party; and Gens. Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who both served in the Politburo. Zhou is now serving a life sentence in prison; Guo is under investigation for corruption charges; and Xu, detained on charges of corruption in early 2014, died in March of cancer. In 2012, men like Zhou elected Xi as president. If this anti-corruption campaign should fail, members of the elite could depose him.

Xi’s strategy for dealing with this threat, like that of his predecessors, is to keep friends close and potential enemies closer. In doing so, Xi has drawn on a decades-old obscure but powerful party tradition. According to interviews with several people close to the ruling party leadership, ex-Politburo members are not allowed to travel overseas without permission from the current PBSC.According to interviews with several people close to the ruling party leadership, ex-Politburo members are not allowed to travel overseas without permission from the current PBSC. “It’s the accepted custom,” said someone with ties to the leadership, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue. This rule applies to dozens of members of China’s political elite, including both living ex-presidents: Jiang Zemin, rumored to be under suspicion for corruption, and Hu Jintao, who is untainted by allegations of graft, said someone with ties to the leadership.

A Chinese expert on China’s leadership, who asked to remain anonymous, said that the rule is so tight that there are likely few cases of ex-Politburo members traveling abroad since the death of Chinese leader Mao Zedong in 1976. “In China, ex-leaders basically don’t leave the country,” said David Lampton, director of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

There are rules governing the travel of current Politburo members — they cannot go overseas more than once a year, except for special work-related circumstances, and they must generally keep their trips within 3-5 days, according to a 1989 regulation. It is unclear, however, if there is a specific regulation governing whether or not former Chinese leaders are permitted to travel overseas. Elite politics in China “is a huge black box,” said Lampton. Bo Zhiyue, the director of Victoria University of Wellington’s New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre and an expert on elite Chinese politics, speculates that former Politburo members don’t possess personal passports: They use official passports, held at the General Office, a party body that handles the administrative affairs of the Politburo and other government organs. “If you don’t have a passport, you can’t travel abroad,” he said.

Apart from that they might be a target of his anti-corruption campaign, there are several other possible reasons why Xi might benefit from restricting former Chinese leaders from traveling overseas. He is, perhaps, paranoid about defection or personal embarrassment. “These people have a lot of secrets,” said Bo. Former Politburo members may have “inside information that is detrimental to the image of the party,” he said. “If there is a way to block that person [from leaving], they will do so.”

Xi, who has consolidated power faster than his two recent predecessors, Jiang and Hu, may also fear that former leaders could distract attention from the current Politburo. “It is apparently a method to make room for the existing leadership, so that the previous leadership does not upstage” the current ones, said Dali Yang, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. It also limits their ability to engage in unwanted policymaking — not unlike when ex-U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in 1994. Carter, who had a relationship with longtime North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung, was there on behalf of then-U.S. President Bill Clinton to help solidify a nuclear deal: Carter reportedly negotiated beyond what the administration was willing to give. “In the United States, an ex-president is a valuable asset,” said Bo. “In China, they don’t want these people to come back to politics. They keep them as far away as possible.”

Consider the March funeral of Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, a man who maintained close relations with both the United States and China. Clinton led the U.S. delegation to the funeral. China sent current Politburo member and Vice President Li Yuanchao. “Foreign policy historically has been very carefully managed, and China places a lot of emphasis on making sure that’s still the case,” said Yang. Keeping former Chinese leaders at home prevents them from engaging in maverick policymaking.

And Beijing would likely be displeased were they to travel around the world consulting, like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, or giving six-figure speeches, like Clinton — especially since Xi launched his anti-corruption campaign. on the one hand, one Chinese professor with high-level ties, who asked to speak anonymously, said that Chinese leaders “don’t need to make money” like Blair and Clinton. Indeed, it’s widely believed that many former Chinese leaders are extremely wealthy, due to deals facilitated for relatives by high-level connections during time in office.

That wealth, however, can be a liability. In an investigation published in April 2014, the New York Times found that three of Zhou’s relatives hold or held stakes “in at least 37 companies scattered across a dozen provinces, from Audi dealerships to property firms.” More than a year before Beijing sentenced Zhou to life in prison in June for accepting bribes, among other crimes, it reportedly seized at least $14.5 billion in assets from his family members and his associates.

* * *

The no-travel rule does seem to allow for a bit of flexibility. The Chinese expert on China’s leadership emphasized that it doesn’t include the special Chinese territories of Hong Kong or Macau, and he speculated that ex-Politburo members may have gone abroad secretly — unknown to the public and also possibly unknown to Beijing. The rule also appears to discount those who travel because they have a new job: Consider, for example, the case of Zeng Peiyan, who served in the Politburo from 2002 to 2007. Now, as chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, an economic research consultancy, Zeng regularly travels overseas. Zeng visited Malaysia in June, and in early November he spoke at a conference in London. Still, it’s extremely rare for an ex-Politburo member to secure a high-profile job that allows him to travel overseas. “Zeng is truly an exception,” said Bo.

So, if they’re not traveling overseas, then what are ex-leaders doing? Their lives out of office are far more similar to ex-President George W. Bush, famous for painting on his Texas ranch, or ex-President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who retired to a farm in Pennsylvania to raise cattle, than they are to the lives of Clinton and Blair. Party propaganda tries to portray their lives as simple and modest, their habits austere. Li Lanqing, who served in the PBSC under Jiang from 1997 to 2002 and is known for his love of classical music, designs Chinese seals and reportedly tried to get a job working at a small restaurant. (Of course, it’s difficult to determine what they’re actually doing: None of the living ex-leaders mentioned in this story were reachable for comment; the party’s Organization Department, which handles personnel, couldn’t be reached for comment; and the Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to multiple requests for comment.) Many former Chinese leaders write books or memoirs. And some, like Jiang, stay publicly, though subtly, active in politics.

Part of the reason so few ex-Politburo members have traveled overseas in the 66 years that the party has ruled China is that until roughly two decades ago, not many survived long enough to retire.Part of the reason so few ex-Politburo members have traveled overseas in the 66 years that the party has ruled China is that until roughly two decades ago, not many survived long enough to retire. Mao Zedong died in office in September 1976, as did longtime marshal and PBSC member Zhu De in July of that year and Premier Zhou Enlai in January. Mao’s 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, an anarchic campaign that upended China’s social and political order, saw other top officials meet less graceful ends: Shortly after Mao’s designated successor, Marshal Lin Biao, broke with the chairman, he died in a mysterious 1971 plane crash. And some died in chains: Liu Shaoqi, China’s president until the late 1960s, died in 1969 after several years of torture.

After Mao died, the Politburo became a much safer place for its members: Mao’s successors didn’t possess the power (or perhaps the stomach) to murder their opponents. When Deng Xiaoping came to power a few years later, many of China’s elite were tired of the devastating infighting that characterized the Mao years. Riding the prevailing political wind, and mindful of his sometimes precarious position as China’s paramount leader in the 1980s and 1990s, Deng arrested his top party opponents, kept them under de facto house arrest, or sidelined them — but didn’t murder them. Consider, for example, the Gang of Four — Politburo members, blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution — all of whom served long terms in prison.

Deng’s successors, Jiang and Hu, both oversaw the arrest and imprisonment of a few of their high-ranking political enemies, but not on the scale of today. More than any leader since Deng, Xi is reviving the Maoist tradition of imprisoning ex-leaders. He has taken down several ex-Politburo members — most spectacularly Zhou, China’s former security czar. Perhaps because of his aggressive anti-corruption campaign, Xi’s position among the political elite may be precarious. In April 2014, ex-President Hu visited Mao’s home province of Hunan, which some analysts interpreted — through the foggy lens of party symbolism — as a critique of Xi’s stern Maoism. But don’t count on Hu taking his message overseas anytime soon. Xi will likely want him close and quiet, perhaps to the detriment of China’s political stability. “The tension is much higher,” said Bo — all these powerful ex-Politburo members, “stuck in one country and unable to leave.”

http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Why-Xi-honored-a-deposed-reformer

December 4, 2015 1:00 pm JST

Why Xi honored a deposed reformer

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer

TOKYO -- China's leadership in November marked what would have been the 100th birthday of Hu Yaobang, the late former general secretary of the Communist Party. Hu's legacy as a "right wing" reformer remains a taboo subject. Yet all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including President Xi Jinping, turned out for a roundtable discussion held in his honor at the Great Hall of the People.

This has China watchers wondering why Xi and the rest of the nation's top decision-making panel paid tribute to a man who was once fired from his post atop the party.

On Jan. 16, 1987, Deng Xiaoping, then China's supreme leader, ousted Hu from his role as general secretary due to his handling of nationwide student protests. The fallen party boss died on April 15, 1989. His death -- which prompted widespread mourning, including among students -- is seen as a catalyst for the so-called Tiananmen Square incident on June 4 of that year, when the Chinese military suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators.

Hu had boldly pushed for economic liberalization and developed a reputation as a rightist, by Communist standards. More than a quarter-century after his death, he is still revered by many Chinese for his liberal stance. He remains a politically sensitive figure, in part due to pressure to re-evaluate the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The Communist Party has ruled out a re-examination of the incident and condemned the protests as a counterrevolutionary riot.

In addition to the centennial tribute on Nov. 20, Xi recently allowed the publication of a collection of Hu's speeches and writings. The last of these were composed in October 1986, shortly before the wave of student protests began.

None of this means Xi, who serves as both president and general secretary, is embracing "democratization" or "liberalization." The centennial event should be seen in the context of the president's efforts to strengthen his grip on power.

Political balancing act

On Nov. 25, just five days after the event for Hu, another event in Beijing honored Deng Liqun, a former head of the Communist Party's Publicity Department who died in February at the age of 99.

Deng Liqun, a foe of Hu's, opposed the policy of "reform and opening up" initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Until his death, he continued to wield strong influence with a group of "new leftists" who idolize Mao Zedong, the revolutionary leader who led China to communism.

Deng Liqun once served as secretary of the Communist Party's Central Secretariat, but he never became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. His rank in the party hierarchy was much lower than Hu's. Nevertheless, Xi dispatched Liu Yunshan, the party's No. 5 official, to the discussion held in his honor on Nov. 25, the 100th anniversary of his birth.

Xi and the other six members of the powerful committee attended Deng Liqun's funeral.

"Xi Jinping's relations with the 'second red generation' and the 'princeling' factions hold the key to understanding the memorial event for Hu Yaobang," said one man close to the former faction. The princelings are the children of prominent and influential senior party officials, while the second red generation is a smaller group of the offspring of revolutionary-era Communist Party leaders.

"The second red generation has both rightists and leftists," the man explained. "Xi is giving consideration to both."

Hu was an ally of Xi's father, Xi Zhongxun. The elder Xi defended Hu to the end, earned Deng Xiaoping's displeasure and was effectively purged -- after which his health deteriorated.

President Xi and Hu Deping, Hu Yaobang's oldest son, grew up under similar circumstances and remain on good terms. The president wants to keep it that way, as Hu Deping has a vast network of personal connections, especially among rightists and reformists.

Daughter of a "traitor"

In some ways, Xi faces a bigger challenge in dealing with the leftists.

Soon after becoming China's top leader, Xi said in a lecture that "the 30-year historical period after reform and opening up cannot be used to deny the 30-year historical period before reform and opening up," referring to the Mao days. The remark, a nod to leftists, had its intended effect. Many on the left side of China's political spectrum expressed their support for Xi. one called him "wonderful" and said, "Our dark days under the administration of Hu Jintao are over," referring to Xi's predecessor.

Yet leftists were alarmed in November 2013, when Xi's government unveiled bold reforms, including the reorganization of state-owned companies. This sparked political attacks on Premier Li Keqiang, seen as the driving force behind the plans.

Around that time, the case of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was becoming a focal point. For many Chinese leftists, Zhou was a hero. He played a key role in developing state-run oil companies and, as public security minister and head of the Communist Party's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, took a hard line on pro-democracy forces.

Zhou was placed under investigation in December 2013 as part of Xi's anti-corruption drive. "If they really catch Zhou Yongkang, they should also catch [former Premier] Wen Jiabao, who is also embroiled in a scandal involving money," said a senior scholar and leading leftist at a Beijing university.

This past June, Zhou was sentenced to life in prison after being found guilty of bribery and other crimes.

Still, while Xi has been using his crusade against corruption to weed out potential political rivals, he has been dragging his feet on reforms of state-run companies amid vehement resistance from the left. He has made other allowances, too.

Xi has made it clear he will not tolerate "private political meetings," in accordance with the Communist Party's "eight point" regulations for official conduct. But the second red generation appears to be an exception.

In November 2014, a woman named Lin Doudou spoke at a meeting of the offspring of senior officials of the Red Army -- the predecessor of the People's Liberation Army. She is the daughter of Lin Biao, a former Red Army commander who was later branded a "traitor" for allegedly turning against Mao.

Photos of Lin Doudou attending the meeting went viral online.

Over this year's Chinese New Year holidays, the daughter of Hu Qiaomu, an influential leftist politician, and others held a large gathering. Xi looked the other way.

Keeping the pressure on

While Xi is willing to throw both the left and right a bone now and then, there are limits. There are no signs he intends to loosen controls on the media, for example.

Yanhuang Chunqiu, a liberal reformist magazine, has found itself in a particularly precarious position. Its editor-in-chief, Yang Jisheng, was forced to resign in July. Plans for Hu Deping, Hu Yaobang's son, to become head of the magazine remain in limbo.

Yanhuang Chunqiu had close ties to the president's father. In 2001, the magazine's 10th anniversary, the elder Xi presented it with a piece of calligraphy, praising its work. He died the following year.

Nevertheless, the president continues to squeeze the publication through the party's Publicity Department. In Xi's China, freedom of speech remains out of the question.

In the same vein, the president is not allowing serious study of Mao's two disastrous campaigns -- the 1958-1961 Great Leap Forward and the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution. He may fear that shedding light on the real consequences of the campaigns could threaten the Communist Party's rule.

Yang, the deposed editor who once worked as a journalist for the state-run Xinhua News Agency, estimated in his book "Tombstone" that 36 million people starved to death due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. The book was published in Hong Kong but banned on the mainland.

In 2013, after Xi took the helm, Yang expressed concerns about the lack of free ｅxpression in the country. "China has a constitution," he said. "But we are not allowed to have free discussions on 'constitutional politics.'"

In China, the Communist Party's guidance trumps the constitution. The country's leaders fret that Western democracies are plotting to end their rule in the name of "constitutional politics."

It's who you know

From the president's perspective, he can rely on only a limited number of members of the second red generation. They include Liu Yuan, the son of former President Liu Shaoqi; Liu Yazhou and his wife, Li Xiaolin; and Zhang Youxia.

Liu Yuan, Liu Yazhou and Zhang Youxia are all generals in the People's Liberation Army.

Li Xiaolin is the daughter of former President Li Xiannian and currently serves as the president of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Zhang Youxia is the son of the late Gen. Zhang Zongxun.

Xi is counting on these personal connections to help him control both the left and right wings of the Communist Party.

One could say Xi is adopting the political strategy of China's left and the economics of its right.

The former is exemplified by the anti-corruption drive, which is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. Like Xi's, Mao's campaign was part of a power struggle.

Meanwhile, the president is continuing the policy of economic reform and opening up initiated by Deng Xiaoping.

http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-launches-siege-of-Shanghai-faction

December 18, 2015 6:00 pm JST

Xi launches siege of Shanghai faction

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer

TOKYO -- Ai Baojun, Shanghai's 55-year-old vice mayor, was placed under investigation for disciplinary violations and dismissed in November, sending shock waves through political, bureaucratic and business circles in China's financial and economic center.

The disgraced official once served as president of Baoshan Iron & Steel, a major player in one of Shanghai's key industries. He also had a high-profile role as the director of the regulatory commission of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone.

As deputy mayor, Ai was also in charge of economic planning, prices, energy source development, port operations, social stability and held a number of other key responsibilities. He served as a conduit between the city's business and bureaucratic circles.

Ai also has close ties to 89-year-old former Chinese president Jiang Zemin, who continues to wield considerable influence in Shanghai. Ai has a close relationship with Jiang's 64-year-old son, Jiang Mianheng. The two are often seen together during local gatherings.

The younger Jiang abruptly lost his post as head of the Shanghai branch of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences in January this year, reportedly expelled from the organization as part of President Xi Jinping's efforts to weaken the elder Jiang's power.

Shock waves

Since taking office, the 62-year-old Chinese leader has embarked on an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, vowing to crack down on both "tigers" and "flies" -- powerful leaders and low-level officials. Many view the drive as a move to consolidate power.

A number of high-profile individuals have been apprehended as part of the campaign, but Ai Baojun is the first big name in Shanghai to fall victim. China's largest city is the stronghold of a group of politicians and bureaucrats loyal to Jiang Zemin, dubbed the "Shanghai faction."

Ai is now known as "Shanghai's first tiger" to be ensnared.

The Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, China's cabinet, have trumpeted Shanghai's free trade zone as a symbol of the country's economic opening-up to the rest of the world. The dismissal of the director has resulted in confusion and alarm in the city's political and business communities.

Clearly wishing to avoid falling foul of the country's strict information controls, the authorities have been reluctant to provide detailed explanations about the current situation in response to inquiries from foreign companies operating in the zone, simply reiterating there is "no impact" on operations.

Xi became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in the autumn of 2012 and assumed the presidency in the spring of 2013.

The Communist Party is to hold its next quinquennial national congress in the autumn of 2017. Xi is expected to stay in the post of party leader beyond 2017, but many believe the identity of his successor will only become clear at the meeting.

"The war has finally broken out ahead of the 2017 party meeting, with Shanghai as its first battlefield," said a source familiar with the city's politics. "The probe into the deputy mayor has signaled the outbreak of the war. The war has just started and will enter a crucial period next year."

Earlier in December, Guo Guangchang, the chairman of Shanghai-based investment company Fosun Group who is known as "China's Warren Buffett," disappeared for some days. When he resurfaced in the middle of the month, it was reported that he had been cooperating with the authorities in ongoing investigations.

But the truth of Guo's temporary disappearance is still unclear. There are rumors that Guo was apprehended in connection with the case of Ai Baojun or a corruption case involving another company.

Whatever the true circumstances, there can be little doubt of the political message from the Xi administration to the business community in Shanghai: "If you are not on our side, you will run into trouble."

President Xi has significantly consolidated his power base through his anti-corruption campaign. But despite his advanced age and the loss of a certain amount of political clout, Jiang still retains considerable influence.

Communist Party sources said that Jiang still has enough power to oppose Xi's policies and remains a "formidable" foe for the president.

Chen Liangyu case

The fate of Ai Baojun is not dissimilar to the 2006 case of Chen Liangyu, Shanghai's top official at the time. Chen was placed under investigation for corruption and other charges and removed from his post.

After a lengthy inquiry, Chen was expelled from the Communist Party immediately before the party's national congress in the autumn of 2007. He was sentenced to 18 years in jail the following year.

Chen was Jiang's protege and widely seen as a promising new-generation politician. The former engineer belonged to the so-called machine-building industry faction, which forms the core of the Shanghai faction.

As part of Jiang Zemin's efforts to maintain his political influence after retiring, Chen was rapidly promoted in the early 2000s, looking set to eventually become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Communist Party's top decision-making body.

Chen's arrest was part of then-President Hu Jintao's efforts to nullify the Shanghai faction in the run-up to top leadership changes at the Communist Party's 2007 national congress.

Hu had taken over from Jiang as China's leader at the party's 2002 national congress.

Eliminating Chen was seen as a significant boost for Hu in his power struggle with the Shanghai faction. But he suffered a serious setback five years later.

Hu is the most senior leader of the Communist Youth League faction, a large political force within the Communist Party comprised of former officials of the party's youth organization.

At the party's 2007 national congress, Hu failed to force through the promotion of his protege Li Keqiang to a rank high enough to ensure a direct transfer of power. This was largely due to Jiang's strenuous efforts to prevent Li from becoming China's new leader to curb the power of the Communist Youth League faction.

Jiang's power struggle with Hu worked in Xi's favor, as he was promoted to a position in the Politburo Standing Committee and ranked sixth in the party hierarchy, one notch higher than Li Keqiang. At the time, Jiang held Xi in fairly low regard and did not imagine the promotion would come back to haunt him.

At the Communist Party's 2012 national congress, Xi Jinping took over as the party's general secretary, edging out Li Keqiang. In a country where government plays second fiddle to the Communist Party, rank and file meant Xi would become president while Li would assume the post of premier the following year.

But this was not the only major setback Hu suffered at the 2007 national congress.

Zhou Yongkang, a key member of Jiang's group, was promoted to a position in the Politburo Standing Committee ranked ninth in the party hierarchy. Zhou also became the head of the party's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission.

The commission supervises the judiciary and the public security apparatus, including the police. Zhou's appointment paved the way for Jiang to continue to effectively act as the country's chief decision-maker.

Staying alert

Ai Baojun's arrest can be interpreted as Xi's commencement of a siege against Jiang's Shanghai faction.

Xi may have consolidated power through his anti-corruption drive, but as the power struggle between Hu and Jiang showed, he cannot afford to let his guard down.

Even if Xi continues to have the upper hand over Jiang, the tables could still be turned.

Wang Qishan is China's 67-year-old anti-corruption czar and key ally of President Xi. Wang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, serves as the head of the Communist Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's top anti-graft body.

Wang's movements have received little media coverage in recent months. There is speculation that he might be preparing for the arrest of another influential figure.

China's power struggles only look set to intensify in the lead-up to the next national congress in the autumn of 2017, which will be make-or-break time for both Xi and his opponents.

http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-continues-clashing-horns-with-party-elders

August 21, 2015 7:00 pm JST

Xi continues clashing horns with party elders

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer

TOKYO -- In China, even after a new leader takes office, his predecessor often continues to wield power through the numerous senior officials he installed -- whether in the Communist Party, the military or the government -- before stepping down.

This system has much in common with the practice of insei, or "rule by a retired emperor," in ancient Japan.

"When China's leadership succession takes place, the outgoing leader sets his hook cunningly," one Beijing resident -- a longtime acquaintance of this reporter -- said sometime between 2002 and 2003, when China saw the transfer of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. "It is a ruthless practice aimed at showing off his influence even after retirement. Such is the case with companies as well as the government."

Those words proved accurate.

Even after retiring as Chinese president and general secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang remained at the helm of the military as chairman of the Central Military Commission for a while.

During that time, he tapped Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, his proteges in the military, as vice chairmen of the powerful commission. It was not until the autumn of 2004 that Hu took over from Jiang as the body's chairman.

Once he did, he found himself in a difficult position. Guo, Xu and other military officers loyal to Jiang did not come to heel, and Hu eventually had to ask Jiang for behind-the-scenes maneuvering to make military decisions. It was a classic case of insei politics.

Because of Jiang's continued influence, Hu was never able to take true control of the military. But the two former top uniformed officers, Guo and Xu, have had to face the music. The pair was recently branded "corruption personified" and driven out of office by incumbent President Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu.

No comeback for Jiang?

The People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, published an eyebrow-raising commentary on Aug. 10, whose title claimed that once a person leaves a post with real power, he or she loses that power.

The commentary, written in a refined style, lambasted the negative effects of the insei system, citing a historical case to make its point. It was written by Gu Bochong, who hails from the military.

In China, it is not unusual for those in the military to also engage in literary pursuits. Mo Yan, who won the 2012 Nobel Prize in literature, also has a military background. But it is perhaps noteworthy that the critical commentary comes from within Jiang's onetime power base.

Moreover, Gu's hometown is in Jiangsu Province, the same as Jiang and Zhou Yongkang. Zhou, one of Jiang's key allies, is a disgraced former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Communist Party's top decision-making body.

Some leaders "installed their cronies [in key positions] to create conditions for them to wield influence in the future [after retirement]," Gu's commentary, as quoted in some media outlets, said.

As a result, the writer continued, new leaders were unable to carry out their jobs boldly, and factionalism demoralized the people and undermined the Communist Party's cohesion and capabilities.

The commentary, widely seen as a criticism of Jiang, sparked a wave of discussion on Chinese social media, including WeChat and Weibo.

"It means the end of Lao Jiang (Jiang Zemin)," one post read. "There will be no more 'Dongshan comeback' for him."

According to one theory, the phrase "Dongshan comeback" is based on a historical event in ancient China in which a government official secluded himself on Dongshan Ridge before staging a return to power.

Indeed, Jiang himself visited Dongshan Ridge, a scenic mountain located on Hainan Island in southern China, in January.

An earlier article in this series explained how that visit generated rumors that Jiang was sending a coded message expressing his determination to regain lost political ground and calling on members of his faction to fight back against Xi.

Another post on Chinese social media said, "Will Uncle Xi target the toad?" The toad is a reference to Jiang.

The Chinese authorities strictly monitor the Internet and immediately delete posts that are deemed harmful. They have left the bulk of the posts about the Gu's commentary untouched, however, a move that speaks volumes about the Xi administration's intentions.

Closing in on Hu

Some posts were written with leadership changes at the Communist Party's next national congress, in 2017, in mind.

One said that if the commentary is correct, "Guangdong Province's small Hu is no longer qualified" to become Xi's successor, while another post said Hu Jintao "has lost his power" to name China's next leader.

"Small Hu" is Hu Chunhua, the Communist Party's secretary in Guangdong Province and a member of the Politburo, as well as a promising sixth-generation member of the Communist Youth League, the party's youth organization. He is also former President Hu Jintao's protege.

The Communist Youth League is one of the party's two strongest factions, the other being the so-called princelings, the children of prominent and influential senior party officials.

Hu Jintao, the paramount leader of the Communist Youth League, wants to recommend Hu Chunhua as Xi's successor. But the commentary by Gu Bochong is not just a thinly-veiled criticism of Jiang -- it also reflects Xi's desire to curb Hu Jintao's power and counter the rise of Hu Chunhua. If Jiang Zemin's insei-style maneuvering is not allowed, Hu's will not be either.

One post by a person familiar with Chinese politics asked sarcastically, "Will Uncle Xi still be able to publish this [kind of] commentary in 2020?"

The implication is that Xi might also come embrace the insei system -- as long has he is the one playing the role of retired emperor. If his ambitions are big enough, Xi could even try to engineer the extension of his term in office.

Under the constitution, a Chinese president can serve up to two five-year terms. Xi is scheduled to retire as the Communist Party's general secretary in 2022 and as Chinese president in 2023.

Desire for control

For many years, the Communist Party has held a summer conclave in Beidaihe, Hebei Province. The closed-door meeting in the seaside resort brings together the country's current leaders and party elders to discuss important issues in an informal setting.

Since Xi came to power, negative rumors about the Beidaihe meeting have started spreading from sources close to the Xi administration almost every year, just before summer.

There have been rumors the Beidaihe meeting will not be held this year, and that the Xi administration is now "free from the old practices."

Such rumors hint at Xi's desire to do away with the Beidaihe meeting entirely and make decisions on all issues himself, rather than listen to the opinions of his predecessors. The timing of Gu's commentary criticizing the lingering influence of retired leaders further reinforces that impression. The piece was published during this year's Beidaihe meeting.

But Xi did not get his wish, and the meeting convened again this year. At the end of the day, China is still a country where the Confucian ideas about the relationship between seniors and juniors are highly valued.

China's recent surprise devaluation of its currency, which sent shock waves through global markets, is likely a reflection of the tense atmosphere at this year's Beidaihe meeting.

Former President Jiang and other elders unhappy with Xi's political style have been looking for an opportunity to put pressure on him. one way of doing this is blaming his administration for focusing exclusively on corruption and failing to address the country's economic slump. By devaluing the yuan, the administration hoped to circumvent such criticism.

Though it was not on the official agenda, the question of who will succeed Xi was likely a critical issue at this year's Beidaihe meeting. It will spend so much time, however, before even an outline of what party elders said about the matter are leaked to the public.

'뉴스-미국제외 > 뉴스 - 중국 홍콩 대만' 카테고리의 다른 글

2016년 중국 경제 전망…국유기업 효율성 높인다? (0)	2015.12.30
중국 상하이지수 2.6%하락...한 달만에 최대폭 (0)	2015.12.28
중국 2016 ) 농민의 도시이주 촉진…부동산 공급 과잉 해소 (0)	2015.12.25
중국 2016 ) 재정적자 2조위안...경기부양 감세 5000억위안 (0)	2015.12.25
중국 경제공작 회의 해통증권 리포트 (0)	2015.12.24

현재글시진핑의 장쩌민(상하이 파) 뭉개기 스토리

心七技三

Today :
Yesterday :

心七技三